Mercer Law Review
Volume 49
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 4

12-1997

Business Associations
Paul A. Quirós
Lynn Schutte Scott
Lora A. Tarle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Quirós, Paul A.; Scott, Lynn Schutte; and Tarle, Lora A. (1997) "Business Associations," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 49 : No. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol49/iss1/4

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

SURVEY ARTICLES

Business Associations
by Paul A. Quir6s"
Lynn Schutte Scott*
and
Lora A. Tarle*
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia law in the areas
of corporate, partnership, securities, and banking law.' It covers
noteworthy cases decided during the survey period by Georgia state and
appellate courts, United States district courts located in Georgia, and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Also included are legislative
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Mercer Law Review (1986-1988); Research Editor (1987-1988). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Florida State
University (B.S., 1991); Samford University (J.D., 1996). Member, Cumberland Law
Review (1994-1996). Member, State Bar of Georgia; State Bar of Alabama.
1. The survey period is June 1, 1996 through May 31, 1997.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

enactments by the Georgia General Assembly revising the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.

CORPORATIONS

A.

Piercingthe Corporate Veil
Georgia courts will often pierce the corporate veil, thereby disregarding the corporate entity, to hold its shareholders personally liable. Veil

piercing is commonly relied upon to prevent use of the corporate form to
perpetrate fraud or other injustice. In determining whether to disregard
the corporate entity, Georgia courts often apply the alter ego doctrine.
The inquiry is whether the corporation acted as the alter ego or business
conduit of its owner. Decisions addressing the issue are unpredictable,
often yielding inconsistent results.
1. Georgia Supreme Court Emphasizes that the Alter Ego
Theory is Distinct from Agency and Joint Venturer Theories of
Liability. The Georgia Supreme Court recognized the confusion
apparent in cases applying the alter ego doctrine in Kissun v. Humana,
Inc. ,2 a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against parent
corporation Humana, Inc., its wholly-owned subsidiary Humana
Hospital-Newnan, and an individual physician. The court of appeals had
concluded that because there was no evidence justifying piercing the
corporate veil between parent and subsidiary, there could be no claim
against the parent under agency or joint venturer theories.8 The
Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a parent
corporation can be held liable for the acts or omissions of a wholly-owned
subsidiary corporation under theories of apparent or ostensible agency
or joint
venturer although evidence is insufficient to pierce the corporate
4
veil.
The supreme court held that insufficient evidence to pierce the
corporate veil does not automatically preclude parent corporation
liability under agency or joint venturer theories.5 The court noted that
confusion often arises because alter ego, agency, and joint venturer
theories are closely intertwined.6 "In discussing the alter ego doctrine,
the courts frequently invoke the term 'agency' in the context of the
subsidiary corporation having been so organized and controlled and its

2.
3.
4.
5.

267 Ga. 419, 479 S.E.2d 751 (1997).
Id. at 419, 479 S.E.2d at 752.
Id
Id., 479 SE.2d at 751.

6. Id.
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business conducted in such a manner as to make it merely an agency,
instrumentality, adjunct, or alter ego of another corporation." 7 While
there are situations in which evidence that supports veil piercing also
establishes an agency relationship between the parties, the theories are
distinct. The court remanded the case for consideration of whether
evidence existed that the subsidiary hospital acted as an agent or was
a joint venturer with parent Humana, Inc. to allow a finding of liability
in the absence of veil-piercing factors.'

2. Requisites for Piercing Corporate Veil Not Met. In NEC

Technologies, Inc. v. Nelson,9 the supreme court again reversed the court
of appeals finding that NEC Technologies, Inc. ("Technologies"), an
importer of electronic components, was not the alter ego of NEC Ltd.,
manufacturer of the components.10 Plaintiffs sued Technologies, but
not manufacturer NEC Ltd., for injuries arising from a fire allegedly
caused by defective electrical components in a Curtis Mathes television
set." Because the supreme court's review of the record revealed that
Technologies and NEC Ltd. had not commingled funds nor shared
officers and employees, the evidence did not suggest that Technologies
acted as the alter ego of NEC Ltd. by importing the components.'"
Plaintiffs' assertion that NEC Ltd. performed its business in the United
States through Technologies and a Curtis Mathes agent's inability to
distinguish between the entities did not create a question of fact on the
issue. 3
Although neither of these cases clarified the Georgia courts' application of veil-piercing doctrines, these cases are noteworthy as indicators
of the extension of allegations of veil piercing by plaintiffs in nonconstruction related cases.
B. Successor Liability: Under "De Facto Merger"or "Mere Continuation" Theories, Second InsurerSucceeded to Liabilitiesof FirstInsurer
as Result of Reorganization
In Dickerson v. Central United Life Insurance Co.,' 4 a fraud action
against Life of America Insurance Co., the court applied de facto merger

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 420, 479 S.E.2d at 752-53 (citations omitted).
Id at 422, 479 S.E.2d at 754.
267 Ga. 390, 478 S.E.2d 769 (1996).
Id. at 397, 478 S.E.2d at 775.
Id. at 390, 478 S.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 397, 478 S.E.2d at 775.
Id.
932 F. Supp. 1471 (M.D. Ga. 1996).
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and mere continuation theories to justify its amendment of a pretrial
order to name Central United as the defendant in the fraud action."
The court found that even though the parties had structured their
consolidation transaction as a purchase of assets, Central United had
succeeded to the liabilities of Life of America under either de facto
merger or mere continuation theories as a result of Life of America's
acquisition of Central United, consolidation of the companies into a
single entity operating under the Central United name, and bulk
reinsurance by Central United of all of Life of America's policies."6
The court noted the general rule that a purchasing corporation does
not assume liabilities of seller unless: (1) there is agreement to do so;
(2) the transaction is a merger; (3) the transaction is a fraudulent
attempt to avoid liabilities; or (4) the purchaser is a mere continuation
of the predecessor corporation. 7 The court found that the relationship
between Life of America and Central United supported the finding that
Central United succeeded to the liabilities of Life of America."8
First, the court found that the bulk reinsurance and consolidation
transaction met the requisites of a de facto merger because "there was
and remains a continuity of management, assets, business, physical
location, and shareholders between the now defunct entity Life of
America and the new entity known as Central United." 9 Second, the
court concluded that the newly consolidated entity, Central United, was
a "mere continuation' of Life of America.2' The test for whether one
corporation is a mere continuation of another is "whether there is a
continuation of the corporate entity of the seller" with the key element
being "a continuity of officers, directors, and shareholders." Noting
that Georgia law recognizes common law continuation when there is
some identity of ownership, the court found complete identity of
ownership and virtual identity in management between Central United
and the former Life of America.22 Thus, amendment of the fraud action
to add Central United as a party was proper." This case illustrates
that courts may look through the structure of a transaction agreed upon
by the parties if the elements of a de facto merger are present in order
to find continued liability.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 1475.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Imputation of Employee Acts and Omissions to Corporation

1. Attorney-Shareholders in Professional Corporation Not
Personally Liable for Professional Misconduct of Majority
Shareholder Attorney. The Georgia Supreme Court considered
whether shareholder-members of a law firm organized as a professional
corporation can be held jointly and severally liable to a client for the
professional misconduct of another shareholder in the firm in Henderson
v. HSI FinancialServices, Inc.2' HSI sued a law firm and its three
shareholders individually to recover for the majority shareholder's
failure to pay HSI money due under a note representing money collected
by the firm on HSI's behalf.25 HSI prevailed in the lower court against
the two uninvolved shareholders who appealed this decision to the
supreme court. 6
Before Henderson, a member of a firm organized as a professional
corporation was personally liable for the professional misconduct of other
lawyers in the firm.27 In Henderson the Georgia Supreme Court
overruled its earlier holding in First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria" and
rejected this rule of strict liability as inconsistent with the Georgia
Professional Corporations Act.29 The court stated that although it has
the regulatory authority to define the group structure in which lawyers
practice, such as a partnership or professional corporation, relevant
statutes govern whether a particular structural form excepts its
The court held that lawyers
members from personal liability.3'
practicing as shareholders in a professional corporation have the same
rights and responsibilities as shareholders in other professional
corporations."'
The Georgia Professional Corporations Act provides that such a
corporation and its shareholders enjoy the same rights, privileges, and
immunities as shareholders of business corporations. 2 The Georgia

24. 266 Ga. 844, 471 S.E.2d 885 (1996) (overruling First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria,
250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983)).

25. Id at 844, 471 S.E.2d at 886.
26.

Id., 471 S.E.2d at 885.

27. Id. (citing First Bank & Trust, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674).
28. 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983).
29.

266 Ga. at 845, 471 S.E.2d at 886. The Georgia Professional Corporations Act is

codified at O.C.G.A. sections 14-7-1 to -7.
30.

266 Ga. at 845, 471 S.E.2d at 886.

31. Id.
32.

Id. at 846, 471 S.E.2d at 887 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-7-3 (1994)).
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Business Corporation Act," in turn, provides that "a shareholder of a
corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debt of the corporation
except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts
or conduct." 4 The court concluded that the two shareholders were not
jointly and severally liable for the professional misconduct of the
majority shareholder. 5 The court noted that its holding did not
undermine protection of the client because a lawyer practicing in a
professional corporation remains personally liable to clients for his own
acts of professional negligence and the professional corporation itself is
liable to the extent of its corporate assets for the malpractice of its
members. 36
2. Criminal Conviction of Corporation for Theft of Timber
Upheld. In Davis v. State,37 defendant Ronald Davis Logging
Company, Inc. ("Davis Logging") unsuccessfully challenged its conviction
on two counts of theft of timber. This case illustrates the principle that
a corporation may be prosecuted for an act or omission constituting a
crime if an agent of the corporation performs the act that is an element
of the crime while acting within the scope of his office or employment
and on behalf of the corporation.'
Owners of Davis Logging purported to own and later convey timber
rights to a particular tract of land to Keadle Lumber Enterprises when,
in fact, Davis Logging never owned the rights. The owners of Davis
Logging knowingly cut timber from Keadle Lumber's land and sold it
back to Keadle Lumber with the representation that it was from another
tract.39 The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support
conviction of Davis Logging based upon the conduct of its principals
while acting on behalf of the corporation.4"
D.

ShareholderInspection of CorporateRecords
In Westbury Square Townhouses Ass'n v. Bryan,4 1 a case of first
impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals considered what notice is
required to a nonprofit corporation prior to entry of an order allowing its

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

O.C.G.A §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
Id.
266 Ga. at 845, 471 S.E.2d at 886.
Id.
225 Ga. App. 564, 484 S.E.2d 284 (1997).
Id. at 565, 484 S.E.2d at 287-88.
Id. at 566, 484 S.E.2d at 287.
Id.
223 Ga. App. 885, 479 S.E.2d 190 (1996).
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members access to corporate records under O.C.G.A. section 14-31604.42 On application by a member, the trial court ordered Westbury
Square to allow inspection of its corporate records and awarded costs
and attorney fees to the member. Westbury appealed on due process
grounds because it first received notice of the application for inspection
only after the court had entered its order.'
O.C.G.A. section 14-3-1604 provides that a court may summarily issue
an order for access to records of a nonprofit corporation and order
payment of a member's costs and attorney fees." However, section 143-1604 does not specify the form, content, or timing of notice required to
the corporation before it can be ordered to permit access to its records or
to pay costs and attorney fees.4 Although there is a strong public
policy favoring a shareholder's right to inspect and copy corporate
records, the court emphasized that the right must be exercised in a
manner that comports with due process." The court of appeals held
that the trial court violated Westbury Square's due process rights
because Westbury Square did not have a reasonable opportunity to
challenge the member's demand for access to records prior to being
ordered to pay costs and attorney fees.4 7
O.C.G.A. section 14-3-1604 does not define procedures for notice, and
therefore, the court proposed its own guidelines:
(1) A corporate member aggrieved by a corporation's refusal of, or
failure to respond to, a demand for inspection and copying of records

may file an application with the superior court for an order requiring
access and awarding costs and attorney fees; (2) the application shall
be served on the corporation pursuant to O.C.G.A. [section] 9-11-4; and

(3) the court shall expedite a hearing on the matter, as the statute
requires, and the hearing may be set by rule nisi.'

The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
procedure.49

42. O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1604 (1994).
43. 223 Ga. App. at 886-87, 479 S.E.2d at 190-91.
44. Id. at 887, 479 S.E.2d at 191 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1604).
45. Id., 475 S.E.2d at 192.
46. Id., 475 S.E.2d at 191-92.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 889, 475 S.E.2d at 193.
49. Id.
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Breach of FiduciaryDuties

1. Sale of Corporation via Leveraged Buyout to Third Party
Not Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Officers & Directors. In In re
Munford, Inc., ° the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether officers and directors of Munford, Inc. ("Munford") fulfilled their
fiduciary obligation to evaluate a proposed leveraged buyout merger
agreement ("LBO") ultimately entered into by the corporation. Munford,
Inc. alleged that its officers and directors violated the business judgment
rule by approving the LBO without considering the economic effect of the
transaction."' That rule requires officers and directors of companies to
discharge their duties in good faith and with the care of an ordinary
prudent person. 2 Specifically, Munford, Inc. on behalf of itself and
unsecured creditors in Munford, Inc.'s bankruptcy proceeding, contended
that the officers and directors disregarded a written report prepared by
Shearson Lehman Brothers that disfavored an LBO based on its opinion
that Munford would need all of its internally generated cash flow to fund
Munford also argued that its articles of incorporation
growth.'
("Article 9") imposed a higher duty of care on officers and directors than
required under state law and created a private right of action independent from O.C.G.A. section 14-2-152.1(a)(1). 5 Article 9 "requires the
directors and officers to give due consideration to 'the extent to which
the assets of the corporation will be used' for financing and 'the social,
legal, and economic effects of the transaction on the employees,
customers, and other constituents of the corporation.'" 5
The court rejected Munford's arguments and determined that the
directors and officers satisfied their duties under the business judgment
The court found that the record clearly established that
rule."
Munford's officers and directors consulted legal and financial experts
throughout the search for a buyer for Munford, Inc.57 Further, the
court found that Munford's failure to support its contention of a higher
duty of care by presenting any binding legal authority that Munford's

50. 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 611.
52. See O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-830(a) & 14-2-842(a) (1994).
53. 98 F.3d at 611 & n.6.
54. Id. at 611 (referring to OC.G.A. § 14-2-152.1(aX1) (1988). O.C.G.A. section 14-2152.1(a)(1) is currently codified at O.C.G.A. sections 14-2-830 and 14-2-842 (1994)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
\57. Id.
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articles created a separate cause of action imposing a greater duty than
the business judgment rule required rejection of that claim."
2. Predicting Georgia Law, Eleventh Circuit Refuses to
Recognize Financial Adviser Liability for Aiding & Abetting
Breach of Fiduciary Duty. In the same case, Munford urged the
court to recognize a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty against Shearson Lehman Brothers,59 Munford's
financial advisor. Munford argued that Shearson aided and abetted the
directors' and officers' breach of fiduciary duty when it provided a
fairness opinion concerning the buying party's offering price despite its
earlier report that an LBO was not financially prudent for Munford.4'
Such a theory would require a showing that the primary wrongdoer had
a fiduciary duty and breached that duty and that the aider and abettor
knew of the breach and substantially assisted in the wrongdoing."'
The court noted that Georgia courts acknowledge aiding and abetting
causes of action in limited contexts, none of which relate to breach of
fiduciary duty. 2 Predicting Georgia law, the Eleventh Circuit declined
to extend aider and abettor liability to breaches of fiduciary duty
because to do so "would enlarge the fiduciary obligations beyond the
scope of a confidential or special relationship.'
F

General
During the survey period, the court of appeals decided six cases
addressing general principles of corporate law. In Korey v. BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc.," the court held that an individual who
arranged for telephone services with BellSouth on behalf of an unincorporated business was personally liable for both pre- and post-incorporation charges because, upon incorporation of the business, the individual
never advised BellSouth that it was dealing with a newly formed
corporation."' In Kim v. Tex Financial Corp.," the court held that a
maker of a note was estopped to deny the corporate existence of lender
Tex Financial Corporation because the maker had signed the note that

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613.
Id
Id.
Id.
225 Ga. App. 857, 485 S.E.2d 498 (1997).
Id. at 859, 485 S.E.2d at 500.
223 Ga. App. 528, 479 S.E.2d 375 (1996).
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explicitly listed Tex Financial Corporation as payee.' 7 The court of
appeals also held in Cohen v. Capco Sportswear,Inc.6 that a shareholder's handwritten, signed note to a supplier stating that the
shareholder "would be happy to personally guarantee our account"
69 did
in fact constitute a guaranty binding the shareholder personally.
In Crisp Pecan Co. v. Wiggins Produce Co.,7° the court of appeals held
that an Alabama corporation could maintain a suit in Georgia, although
the corporation had not obtained authority to operate in Georgia,
because O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1501(b)- provides an exception for
corporations "transacting business" in Georgia.72 In Altama Delta
Corp. v. Howell,73 the court of appeals held that ambiguities in a
contract for sale and purchase of a corporation's stock and assets
required reversal of summary judgment and remand of the case to the
trial court for a determination of the agreement's meaning.74 Lastly,
in Harish v. Raj, 75 an action by sellers of shares of stock against buyers
alleging that buyers conspired to obtain shares for less than their
market value, the court of appeals held that buyers did not owe a
fiduciary duty to sellers because all parties were directors of the same
corporation.7"
G.

Legislative Changes
The 1997 session of the Georgia General Assembly yielded several
amendments to the Georgia Business Corporation Code, ("Corporate
Code"), the most notable of which are summarized below.
1. Facsimile Transmission. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-141(b) was
amended to provide that a notice sent by facsimile transmission shall be
deemed to be notice in writing for purposes of corporate law.77 The
amendment clarifies that the court of appeals holding in Georgia
Department of Transportation v. Norris,'8 that a fax is not a writing,

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 529, 479 S.E.2d at 376.
225 Ga. App. 211, 483 S.E.2d 634 (1997).
Id. at 212, 483 S.E.2d at 636.
222 Ga. App. 747, 476 S.E.2d 60 (1996).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(b) (1994).
222 Ga. App. at 749, 476 S.E.2d at 62.
225 Ga. App. 78, 483 S.E.2d 127 (1997).
Id. at 80, 483 S.E.2d at 130.
222 Ga. App. 248, 474 S.E.2d 624 (1996).
Id. at 251, 474 S.E.2d at 626.
O.C.GA. § 14-2-141(b) (Supp. 1997).
222 Ga. App. 361, 474 S.E.2d 216 (1996).

19971

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

81

is not generally applicable under the Corporate Code. 79 Amendments
to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-722(b), (c), (d), and (h) and to section 14-2724(d) and (e) added references to facsimile transmission of proxies in
order to conform this language more closely to recent changes in the
Model Business Corporation Act.'O
2. Treasury Shares. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-623 was amended to
include new subsection (d), which provides that when a corporation
having treasury shares declares a share dividend, the dividend shall not
be deemed to include a dividend on treasury shares unless the resolution
declaring the dividend expressly so provides."' The amendment enables
a listed company to preserve the relative value of its treasury shares by
providing a default rule for the treatment of share dividends, which are
sometimes treated as stock splits.8 2 New subsection (e), which authorizes a corporation to create security interests in treasury shares, was
added to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-631.8 Subsection (e) is intended to
allow a corporation to pledge its own treasury shares as collateral for
corporate obligations.8 O.C.G.A. section 14-2-721(b) was amended to
preclude a corporation from voting its own shares. A corporation's
subsidiaries are already covered by this prohibition.'
3. Shareholders' Meetings. Subsection (a) to O.C.G.A. section 142-702 was revised to eliminate the requirement that a shareholder
demand be delivered only to the corporate secretary thus permitting
delivery to the corporation generally." New subsection (e) to O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-702 states that, unless otherwise provided in a corporation's
articles of incorporation, a shareholder may revoke by a writing a
written demand for a special meeting if the writing is received by the
corporation prior to the call of the special meeting.87 New subsection
(f) to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-702 provides that a bylaw provision
governing the percentage of shares required to call special meetings is
not a quorum or voting requirement.88

79. O.C.G.A.

§

14-2-141(a) (Supp. 1997).

80. Id. § 14-2-722(b), (c), (d), (h) & 14-2-724(d), (e); Id. § 14-2-722 note.
81. I& § 14-2-623(d).
82. Id. note.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. § 14-2-631(e).
Id. note.
Id. § 14-2-721(b) & note.
Id. 14-2-702(a) & note.
Id. § 14-2-702(e).
Id. § 14-2-702(f).
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4. Shareholder Action by Written Consents. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-704(d) was amended to provide that when shareholders act by
written consent, the consents must be dated and must be obtained
within sixty days of each other.8 9 Subsection (d) states:
No written consent shall be effective to take the corporate action
referred to therein unless, within 60 days of the earliest date appearing
on a consent delivered to the corporation in the manner required by
this Code section, evidence of written consents signed by shareholders
sufficient to act by written consent are received by the corporation.'
The amendment was intended to minimize the possibility that shareholder action by written consent will be authorized by persons who may
no longer be shareholders at the time the action is taken."' Subsection
(d) also permits revocation of such consents prior to filing the consents
with the corporation.' O.C.G.A. section 14-2-704(e) provides that these
consents are not effective until filed with the corporation.93
5. Required Appointment of Inspectors for Publicly Traded
Corporations. Newly enacted O.C.G.A. section 14-2-729.1 requires
corporations listed on a securities exchange or Nasdaq to appoint
inspectors of elections and to specify their duties with respect to
supervising elections. 94
6. Voting Rules on Merger and Asset Sales. Several technical
changes were made in voting rules on mergers and asset sales. O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-1103(h), which excuses a corporation from having a
shareholder vote on a merger if its articles of incorporation remain
unchanged, if share ownership of existing shareholders remains
unchanged, and if the shares outstanding after the merger were
authorized prior to the merger, was amended to include references to
share exchanges. 5 O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1202 provides for shareholder
voting on certain asset sales." Subsection (e) specifies the required
majority vote unless the articles of incorporation or the board specifies

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. § 14-2-704(d).
Id
Id. note.
Id.
Id. § 14-2-704(e).
Id. § 14-2-729.1.
Id. § 14-2-1103(h).
Id. § 14-2-1202 (1994).
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a supermajority vote.17 Reference to voting rules contained in bylaws

was inadvertently omitted and is added by this amendment."
7. Reinstatement Following Administrative Dissolution. Former law permitted an administratively dissolved corporation
to be reinstated within five years of the effective date of the dissolution." O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1422(a) was amended to delete the fiveyear limitation.' ° The five-year restriction was also removed by
amendment to O.C.G.A. section 14-3-1422(a), dealing with administrative dissolution of nonprofit corporations." 1
II.

A.

PARTNERSHIPS

Formation

1. Franchise Contract Does Not Create Partnership Relationship. In Anderson v. Turton Development, Inc., 02 the court of appeals
concluded that a franchise contract under which one operates a business
on a royalty basis does not create a partnership or agency relationship. 3 Plaintiff alleged under partnership and agency theories that
franchisor Choice Hotels International, Inc. ("Choice") was liable for
injuries plaintiff sustained from a fall on an allegedly defective handicap
ramp on the premises of a Comfort Inn operated by franchisee Turton
Development."
The court flatly rejected plaintiff's contention that the franchise
agreement between the parties created a partnership relationship under
which Choice could be'held vicariously liable for the actions of its
franchisee, Turton Development.o 5 The court stated that imposition
of liability on a franchisor for the obligations of the franchisee requires
a showing that: "(a) the franchisor has by some act or conduct obligated
itself to pay the debts of the franchisee; or (b) the franchisee is not a
franchisee in fact but a mere agent or 'alter ego' of the franchisor."

97. Id. § 14-2-1202(e) (Supp. 1997).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 14-2-1422 (1994), amended by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1422(a) (Supp. 1997).
100. O.C.GA. § 14-2-1422(a) (Supp. 1997).
101. Id. § 14-3-1422(a).
102. 225 Ga. App. 270, 483 S.E.2d 597 (1997).
103. Id. at 273, 483 S.E.2d at 600.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 274, 483 S.E.2d at 601.
106. Id. (citing McGuire v. Radisson Hotels, Intl., 209 Ga. App. 740, 742, 435 S.E.2d
51, 52 (1993)).
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Concluding that the franchise agreement did not create an actual agency
between Choice and Turton, the court stated that its operational
requirements did not permit Choice to control the time, manner, and
method of daily operations of the franchisee but were merely a means of
protecting Choice's national identity and reputation.0 7 Although the
franchise agreement required construction of handicap ramps, the ramps
were designed, constructed, and maintained by Turton; therefore, Choice
was not directly liable for alleged defects.'
2. Alleged Statement by Individual Regarding Ownership
Interest in Property Did Not Support Liabflity Under Ostensible
Partnership Theory. An individual may be held accountable for
partnership liabilities as an ostensible partner if he "by words spoken or
written or by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another
representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing partner°
ship."'O
The court of appeals examined the limits of the ostensible
partnership doctrine in Lane v. Spragg,"0 a fraud action in which the
purchaser of a horse claimed that the father of a farm owner was the
owner's ostensible partner and, therefore, liable for the owner's
misrepresentations in connection with the sale."'
Although the son represented that his father was his partner, and his
father had cosigned a loan for the purchase of the farm, the court found
that this evidence would not support a finding of ostensible partnership
in light of the father's lack of knowledge of or consent to his son's
statement. 2 First, the court noted that O.C.G.A. section 14-8-16
provides for liability only when the ostensible partner consents to being
held out as a partner."
No evidence of consent existed in this
case." 4 Second, the court found that the father's cosignature on the
loan, while creating a debtor-creditor relationship, did not support a
finding of ostensible partnership." 5

107. Id.
108. Id.
109.

O.C.GA § 14-8-16(a) (1994).

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

224 Ga. App. 606, 481 S.E.2d 592 (1997).
Id. at 606, 481 S.E.2d at 593.
Id., 481 S.E.2d at 594.
Id. at 607, 481 S.E.2d at 594.
Id.
Id. at 608, 481 S.E.2d at 594-95.
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B.

Substituted Service on Secretary of State Authorized
In McClendon v. 1152 Spring Street Associates-Georgia, Ltd. III, 6
the court of appeals addressed whether a plaintiff attempting to serve
process on a limited partnership in a renewal of a personal injury action
made a reasonably diligent effort to serve the limited partnership's
registered agent at its registered office. O.C.G.A. section 14-9-104(h)
authorizes service on the Secretary of State whenever a registered agent
of a limited partnership "cannot with reasonable diligence be found at
the registered office." 1 7 In this case, plaintiff's process server personally went to the limited partnership's registered office on four occasions
within a nine-day period attempting to locate the registered agent. On
his fifth attempt, he obtained the registered agent's phone number and
left a message at the number for the agent."' The court held that the
plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in his attempts to locate the
limited partnership's registered agent and was authorized to serve
process on the Secretary of State." 9
C.

Rights and Liabilities of Partners

1.
Partner Not Entitled to Reimbursement for Alleged
PartnershipExpenses Absent Required ContractualApproval. In
Ledbetter v. Ledbetter,2 ' the court of appeals was called upon to
resolve disputes between two partners engaged in a real estate
investment partnership whose holdings included a shopping center, a
mall, and a residential development. A corporation formed by the
partners, Ledbetter Brothers, Inc. ("LBI"), managed the partnership's
properties. Under the partnership agreement, each partner was
required to submit partnership expenses to a named third party for
approval and payment. However, on numerous occasions, plaintiff failed
to do so. Amendments to the partnership agreement, made to facilitate
termination of the partnership, granted the defendant partner's real
estate company a limited-time exclusive listing for sale of each of the
partnership's properties. During the liquidation of partnership property,
defendant's wife negotiated with a shopping center tenant to buy the
executory portion of the tenant's lease.' 2 '

116. 225 Ga. App. 333, 484 S.E.2d 40 (1997).
117. Id. at 335, 484 S.E.2d at 42 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-9-104(h) (1988)).
118. Id. at 336-37, 484 S.E.2d at 43.

119. Id.
120. 222 Ga. App. 858, 476 S.E.2d 626 (1996).
121. Id. at 859-61, 476 S.E.2d at 627-30.
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Plaintiff claimed that defendant breached his fiduciary duties and
engaged in impermissible self-dealing by willfully interfering in the sale
of partnership property. Plaintiff pointed to defendant's wife's negotiations to buy a leasehold interest in partnership property. On crossmotions for summary judgment, the trial court held that this claim
presented a jury question. 22 The court of appeals affirmed, stating
that a fact issue existed as to whether defendant was acting in a manner
detrimental to the best interests of the partnership by permitting his
wife to acquire an interest in the shopping center lease.' 2 The court
stated that "the law forbids an agent employed to sell [realty] to place
himself in an attitude of antagonism to the interest of his principal, by
associating himself with another in the purchase of the land."" 4
Defendant, as the exclusive broker, owed the utmost duty of good faith
to the partnership."
Defendant asserted that plaintiff willfully breached the expense
approval requirement in the agreement by failing to submit several
expenses for approval. 126 Agreeing with the trial court, the court of
appeals held as a matter of law that plaintiff violated the expense
approval requirement in the agreement because he acknowledged his
failure to submit expenses and admitted to improper use of partnership
funds.127 A jury question remained on the issue of punitive damages
arising out of plaintiff's breach because defendant alleged that plaintiff's
conduct was fraudulent."
2.
Auditor's Allocation of Responsibility Between Two
Partners in Manner Inconsistent with Partnership Agreement
Held Invalid. In McCaughey v. Murphy," the court of appeals held
that an auditor allocating responsibility between two partners lacked
authority to disregard the partnership agreement and award damages
based on a percentage of ownership not provided by the partnership
agreement.3 0 In late 1983, McCaughey and Murphy formed Boxwood
Associates, a Georgia limited partnership, for the purpose of renovating
a historical building. At Boxwoods inception, McCaughey was the sole
general partner, owning slightly greater than a fifty percent interest;

122. Id. at 861, 476 S.E.2d at 628.

123. Id. at 864, 476 S.E.2d at 630.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 863, 476 S.E.2d at 630.
126. Id. at 861, 476 S.E.2d at 628.
127. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 628-29.
128. Id. at 863, 476 S.E.2d at 629-30.
129. 225 Ga. App. 874, 485 S.E.2d 511 (1997).
130. Id. at 877, 485 S.E.2d at 514.
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Murphy, as a limited partner, owned the balance. When the project
encountered financial difficulties in mid-1986, Murphy infused the
project with large amounts of capital that went unmatched by McCaughey. Although McCaughey advised Murphy that he wanted out of the
partnership and would not be responsible for any future funding of the
project, McCaughey did not comply with the partnership agreement,
which required the partners' mutual agreement on terms of withdrawal
or reduction in partnership interest. In fact, McCaughey became a
general partner in October 1987.131

When the venture failed, Murphy sued McCaughey for recovery of
funds Murphy expended to meet partnership obligations and for
contribution against McCaughey as coguarantor on advances related to
the project's completion. McCaughey counterclaimed. A court-appointed
auditor arbitrarily concluded that McCaughey owed Murphy twenty
percent of the capital contributed by Murphy. The trial court adopted
the auditor's award but did not recognize Murphy's right of contribution
against McCaughey" 2
The court of appeals found that the auditor erroneously concluded that
McCaugheys partnership interest and corresponding share of liability
In
was twenty percent rather than slightly over fifty percent."
allocating liabilities between the partners, the auditor was bound by the
partnership agreement, which did not permit unilateral withdrawal."
Because McCaughey had not withdrawn nor reduced his interest in
accordance with the partnership agreement, his ownership interest
remained at just over fifty percent.3 The court also reversed the trial
court on the issue of contribution, rejecting McCaughey's contention that
his consent was necessary for him to be obligated." As a general
partner, McCaughey had personal liability for partnership obligations to
other entities, and as his coguarantor, Murphy had a right to compel
contribution against McCaughey. 37
D.

Termination
In Carnes v. McNeal,"s the court of appeals held that incorporation
of a partnership business and operation of the business in the corporate

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 874-75, 485 S.E.2d at 512-13.
Id. at 874-75, 485 S.E.2d at 512-13.
Id. at 875, 485 S.E.2d at 514.
Id. at 877, 485 S.E.2d at 514.
Id.
Id. at 878, 485 S.E.2d at 515.
Id.
224 Ga. App. 88, 479 S.E.2d 474 (1996).
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form terminated the partnership and led the court to reject a former
partner's claim for money deposited in a corporate bank account."8 9
The court stated that the partner turned shareholder could not rely on
the partnership agreement to recover money that he had paid into the
corporate account. 14
E. Legislative Changes
Several amendments were made to the Georgia Limited Liability
Company Act, 41 Georgia Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act and Uniform Partnership Act."
1. Organization as Limited Liability Limited Partnership. O.C.G.A. section 14-8-62(g) was amended to specifically provide
that an entity may organize initially as a limited liability limited
partnership rather than go through the two-step process under the preamendment law of forming as a limited partnership and then making
the limited liability partnership election.'"
2. Election of Limited Liability Company Status. A Georgia
corporation, limited partnership, or general partnership may elect to
become a limited liability company ("LLC") pursuant to the procedure in
O.C.G.A. section 14-11-212.145 New O.C.G.A. section 14-9-206.2 was
enacted to permit entities to convert into limited partnerships by
following the same procedure for converting to LLC status.'"
3. Single Member Limited Liability Company. The definition
of an LLC contained in O.C.G.A. section 14-11-101(12) was amended to
explicitly state that an LLC may be formed by one member. 4 7 An
amendment to O.C.G.A. section 14-11-101(18) clarified that a writing
adopted by the sole member of a single member LLC constitutes an
operating agreement for all purposes of the statute.1"

139. Id. at 89, 479 S.E.2d at 476.
140. Id.
141. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
142.

Id. §§ 14-9-108 to -1204.

143. Id. 88 14-8-1 to -64.
144. Id. § 14-8-62(g) (Supp. 1997).
145. Id. § 14-11-212 (1994).

146. Id. 8 14-9-206.2 (Supp. 1997).
147. Id. 8 14-11-101(12).
148. Id. § 14-11-101(18).
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4. Real Estate Records May Reflect Conversion of Entity into

LLC. New subsection (d) in O.C.G.A. section 14-11-212 explicitly
permits recordation and notice of the conversion of an existing entity
into an LLC in the real estate records by filing a certified copy of an
LLC election with the clerk of the superior court where any real property
owned by an LLC is located.'49
5. Waiver of Limited Liability. Although a member of an LLC is
not personally liable for the debts or obligations of the company,
subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. section 14-11-303 was amended to explicitly
permit a member of an LLC to agree under a written agreement to
become personally obligated for debts of the company."
III.

SECURITIES

In another case involving Munford, Inc., 51 the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Georgia's stock distribution and repurchase statutes
applied to a leveraged buyout acquisition of Munford, Inc.'52 In the
bankruptcy court, Chapter 11 debtor-corporation Munford, Inc. asserted
that its directors violated Georgia's stock distribution and repurchase
statutes by approving a leveraged buyout merger ("LBO") in which a
third party purchased Munford, Inc.'s outstanding stock, rendering
Munford, Inc. insolvent. The district court adopted the bankruptcy
court's denial of the directors' motion for summary judgment, and the
directors appealed."a
Georgia's capital surplus distribution statute provided that the board
of directors may make distributions to shareholders out of capital
surplus of the corporation in cash or property, but "[no such distribution
shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such
distribution would render the corporation insolvent.""4 Georgia's stock
repurchase statute also prohibited corporate directors from repurchasing
shares when the purchase would render the corporation insolvent."
Directors who vote for or assent to a corporate distribution or stock
repurchase that violates these provisions are subject to joint and several

149. Id. § 14-11-212(d).
150. Id. § 14-11-303(b).
151. In re Munford, 97 F.3d 456 (11th Cir. 1997).
152. Id. at 460 (interpreting O.C.GA. § 14-2-91 (1988) and O.C.G.A. § 14-2-92(e) (1982),
superseded by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-640 (1994)).
153. Id. at 458.
154. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-91 (1988) superseded by OC.G.A. § 14-2-640 (1994)).
155. Id. at 459 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-92(e) (1982) superseded by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-640
(1994)).
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liability for the amount distributed or paid to the extent the payments
violate the restrictions."
On appeal the directors argued that the distribution and share
repurchase statutes only applied when control of the company did not
change hands and thus did not apply to this transaction because it
represented an arm's-length sale of Munford, Inc. to a third party
through an LBO. Alternatively, the directors argued that they were not
personally liable for the alleged statutory violations because they
approved the LBO in good faith and with the advice of counsel."5 7
Adopting the reasoning of the bankruptcy court and affirming the
district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia's restrictions on
distribution and stock repurchase applied to the LBO:
To hold that Georgia's distribution and repurchase statutes did not
apply to LBO mergers such as this, while nothing in these statutes

precludes such a result, would frustrate the restrictions imposed upon
directors who authorize a corporation to distribute its assets or to
repurchase shares from stockholders when such transactions would
render the corporation insolvent.'
The court also held that liability could be imposed even if directors
approved of the LBO in good faith and with advice of counsel because
there is no affirmative defense for good faith and15advice of counsel under
Georgia's distribution and repurchase statutes. 9
IV. BANKING
A Bank's Reversal of Customer's Deposit Three Months afterAcceptance of Draft due to Missing Endorsement Raised Question of
Commercial Reasonablenessof Bank's Actions
In Peavy v. Bank South,1"' the court of appeals emphasized that a
bank must act with commercially reasonable due diligence and good
faith when exercising its contractual rights."' Certain Bank South
customers sued the bank for conversion, tortious conversion, breach of
warranty, and wrongful set-off after the bank debited their account for
the amount of an improperly endorsed check that the bank allowed their

156.
(1994)).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-154(aXl)-(2) (1982), superseded by O.C.GA. § 14-2-832

Id.
Id. at 460.
Id.
222 Ga. App. 501, 474 S.E.2d 690 (1996).
Id at 506, 474 S.E.2d at 694.
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son to deposit into their account. The draft, drawn by CNL Insurance
America on its account with Bank South, was jointly payable to the
plaintiffs' son and Trust Company Bank even though it was endorsed
only by the son. Three months later, upon discovering that the draft had
been knowingly deposited without the copayee's signature, Bank South
reversed the transaction, debiting plaintiffs' account and crediting CNL's
account. At Bank South's request, plaintiffs voluntarily deposited
$5,323.60, the amount of the draft, into their account to make up for the
amount of the draft the bank had removed from plaintiffs' account. 2
The trial court granted summary judgment to Bank South on all
counts, and plaintiffs appealed."6 Reversing only with respect to
plaintiffs' wrongful set-off claim, the court of appeals found that fact
issues remained as to whether Bank South acted in a commercially
reasonable manner in discovering its erroneous acceptance of the
improperly endorsed draft and acted fairly as between its two customers
in correcting the error.'4 Given the general rule that a payor bank
has until midnight of the banking day of receipt of a demand item to
accept and pay or return it, the commercial reasonableness of Bank
South's actions in this case, as depositary and payor bank, was clearly
a question for the jury."
B. Payment Defense to Action on Note
In Resiventure, Inc. v. National Loan Investors," an action by a
successor-in-interest to a receiver of a failed bank against a borrower to
collect on a promissory note, the court of appeals held that defendantborrowers had the right to amend their answers to include a payment
defense without leave of the court approximately seventeen months into
The court also held that the borrowers' payment defense,
litigation.'
which was independent of any side agreement, was not barred by 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e)," which governs agreements against the interests of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."M First, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that the borrowers waived the
payment defense. 70 Under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-8(c), payment is an
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Id. at 501, 474 S.E.2d at 691-92.
Id. at 503, 474 S.E.2d at 692.
Id at 505-06, 474 S.E.2d at 694.
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224 Ga. App. 220, 480 S.E.2d 212 (1996).
Id. at 222, 480 S.E.2d at 215.
12 U.S.C. I 1823(e) (1994).
224 Ga. App. at 223, 480 S.E.2d at 215.
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affirmative defense that may be raised by amendment without leave of
the court at any time before the entry of a pretrial order.'
In this
case the borrowers had amended their answer to include a payment
defense prior to the entry of a pretrial order; thus, leave of the court was
not required.' 72 Second, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
conclusion that the payment defense was barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e),
which precludes the maker of a note from asserting a defense based on7
any agreement that does not clearly appear in the bank's records.1 1
The court found that the borrowers' claim of payment was not based on
any unrecorded or undisclosed 74side agreement and was, therefore, not
barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
C.

General
Finally, during the survey period, the court of appeals decided several
cases touching on minor principles of banking law. On the issue of a
bank's fiduciary duties, the court of appeals decided Wright v. Swint,'7
an action by real estate purchasers against a bank for its failure to
uncover and correct a defective title.1 76 Although noting that the
bank's efforts in loaning money to the purchasers did not create a
fiduciary relationship, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred
in dismissing the bank and its agent for any wrongful acts committed on
and after the defect was discovered. 77 If the defendant bank and its
agent assumed the duty to cure the cloud on title by promises made to
the purchasers, but failed to do so, the bank may have breached a
contractual duty for which an action for damages might lie. 7s
In Moore v. Bank of Fitzgerald,'7 ' a second case concerning an
alleged fiduciary relationship between a bank and its customer, the court
of appeals held that no such relationship existed between a mortgagor
and mortgagee-bank, as creditor and debtor with clearly opposite
interests.'80 A letter from the bank requiring borrower to meet
monthly with a bank official to monitor the progress of borrower's
business did not indicate that lender and borrower had a confidential
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relationship.'' The court of appeals also decided Vass v. Gainesville
Bank & Trust ls2 and held that a bank was not required to honor a
payment demand under a letter of credit when the demand failed to
comply with the terms of the letter of credit.'8, In Hammock v. Bank
South,'"I the court of appeals held that borrowers' voluntary reassumption of a prior debt by signing new promissory notes cured any defects
in borrowers' prior contractual obligations to the bank under an
unsecured letter of credit.1M
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